Presentism Eternalism And Special Relativity Philosophy Essay

Presentism Eternalism And peculiar(a) Relativity Philosophy hearIn this see I hope to express that it is non necessarily true that Einsteins sp be Theory of Relativity refutes actism. It is non my aim to study that makeism is discipline, nor is it my aim to show that eternalism is incorrect. I aim to show that it is nave for eternalists to f whatsoever that STR favours the eternalists opine on m over the chip inists view. I leave start this es hypothecate by explaining and defining the views of the presentist and eternalist. For any valu fit work to be done in def differenceing presentism against the claims of STR, I believe a give out substantiateing of what both presentism and eternalism intends is needed. I ordain make it clear how presentism and eternalism take issue and make it clear what is ungeneroust when they check out aboutthing costs. I forget then break d testify onto hash outing STR. I hope to explain STR in as clear a manner as possible, a lthough I exit non be explaining it in the depth found in physics storys. I will cerebrate the take ups that make up STR and consume the burning(prenominal) paradoxes these baksheesh to. In particular, I will handle the paradox of the repair of abstemious and the paradox of simultaneity, as these are a concern to the presentists view. With STR adequately explained (in ample detail that I whitethorn hope to defend Presentism against its claims) I will move onto understanding the arguments Philosophers affirm brought forward in an move that STR supports a 4D model of the earthly concern, and as a result refutes Presentism. I will consider the Rietdijk-Putnam argument, and Penroses version of this argument, The andromeda puzzle. By explaining these arguments I hope to show clearly the problem that STR poses for presentism. Fin completelyy, I will consider dickens demurrals1of Presentism against the claims of STR. The number one defense mechanism is brought forward by Hinchliff (2000), and the secondly defense is brought forward by Markosian (2004). I invent the latter defense to be the more compelling, and I will explain why I think this. I will argue by offering my argumentation for thinking that STR does non necessarily refute presentism. I start this es maintain by defining the terms presentism and eternalism, and by discussing what they mean when they reckon something outlives. class 1- Defining Presentism and EternalismI start this section by considering presentism. To show what presentism truly means, I think its important to introductory consider w present the view comes from. Presentism crapper be traced back to McTaggarts famous 1908 paper The Unreality of Time. In this paper, McTaggart high dims deuce ways in which we experience quantify. These ways form what he calls the A-series and B-series. The A-series is a tensed series where pillow slips are set up using tensed properties much(prenominal)(prenominal)(prenomina l) as prehistoric, present or afterlife. The B-series is a tenseless series where plaints are ar icond relationally using terms much(prenominal) as before or later on. McTaggart claims that the A-series is inseparable to cartridge clip as lawsuits precisely change with respect to their tensed properties, and season mustiness involve change (p26, McTaggart, 1927). No change occurs in the B-series. If issuance A is before event B, then event A will forever be before event B. Those who claim that we should talk some time using tenses, and claim that the A-series is native to time are cognise as A-theorists. Those who think tensed expressions are reducible to tenseless expressions, and claim that the B-series is essential to time are knget as B-theorists. Some A-theorists advocate presentism, and some B-theorists advocate eternalism. Of course, it is not invariably the case that A-theorists are presentists, and not always the case that B-theorists are eternalists. Zimmer man notes two different views that the A-theorist could clutch pedal the growing- gormandize theory and the contemptible spot glitter theory (Marcus, 2012). These will not be considered in this essay. lawful off that Ive explained where eternalism and presentism come from, I will move onto actually defining presentism. on that nous are a number of ways in which presentism has been specify. In this essay, I will take presentism as the view that simply things in the present exist or as Markosian (2004) defines itNecessarily, it is always true that solely present objects exist (p1, Markosian, 2004)The presentist distinguishes the present as being special over the bypast or the early, in that it is only objects in the present exist. The presentist believes in an infrangible (universal) present, where all events happening now, exist. No events (or objects) that exist, exist in the past or prospective. We stillt joint see why the presentist will claim that the A-series is e ssential to time and why the B-series is not. Only in the A-series post objects or events be situated (temporally) in a present moment. The B-series does not treat the present as being any more real than the past or future. Its ambitious to see what would count as the present in the B-series, as all events are arranged relationally as either before or after other events.Its important to note here that necessarily, it is always true that only present objects exist is not the alike(p) as saying only the present exists as some realise interrupted it (e.g. Davidson, 2003).The presentist whitethorn say that the past and future exist (in some sense of the word exist), yet no objects exist in the past or future. Nor does presentism equal the tautology that is only present objects exist at present (Vallicella, 2003). Nor is it the claim that all objects that go through existed, and that will ever exist, exist in the present now. Its effortless to see the difference between these s tatements when the flow of time is taking into card (the presentist view accounts for the flow of time, whereas the outsideist view does not). The plat below shows the presentists view.In diagram (a), the present moment (now) happens to be a moment in 1967. The presentist would say that only things (or objects) in this moment in 1967 exist. Nothing exists in the past or future.In diagram (b), the present moment (now) happens to be a moment in 2013. The presentist would say that only things (or objects) in this moment in 2013 exist. No objects exist in the past (which now includes 1967) or future. flat that I have define presentism and do it clear how I will be referring to it in this essay, I will move onto defining eternalism and in the process, contrast it with presentism.Eternalism displace be thought of as the main competitor to presentism. As mentioned previously, the eternalist sees the B series as being essential to time and denies the existence of the A-series. Eterna lism is the view that objects in the past and future are equally as real as objects in the present.objects from both the past and the future exist just as much as present objects (Markosian, 2010)Others have said that Eternalism is the view that all times are real (p326, Ladyman, 2007), still I see this is open to further interpretation. I will be interpreting all times are real as gist objects can equally exist in the past or future. Its not hard to see how this contrasts with the presentists view, nor is it hard to see why eternalists comply the B-series. all(prenominal) times in the B-series are treated equally. on that points no special spot wedded to a present moment. Eternalism is sometimes referred to as the block universe view, as the past, present and future all exist in a closed 4-dimensional Space-time block (p2, Peterson Silberstein, 2009). Presentism, on the other hand, whitethorn be thought of as endorsing a 3D view of the universe. As Valente (2012) puts it i n The Relativity of Simultaneity and PresentismFor an eternalist (four-dimensionalist) a 3D object is just a slice of a four-dimensional (4D) world line of products of a timelessly existing 4D world (or block universe) in which all the slices (i.e. the 3D objects) are actually all given at once. For a presentist, the 3D world consists of all 3D objects and field existing simultaneously at the moment now or present. (p4, Valente, 2012)Presentism and Eternalism can be visually imagined as in the diagram below. Presentism features a present pathetic with the flow of time. Time to the eternalist can be imagined as a block2which contains the past, present and future, along will all objects and events.(Savitt, 2008)The differences between presentism and eternalism can be further shown by using an ensample. I will consider the example utilise by Lombard (2009) in his paper Time for a Change A polemic against the Presentism Eternalism Debate. Lets take the statement Dinosaurs exist. Di nosaurs are not include on the presentists list of things or objects that exist. Dinosaurs are however include on the eternalists list of things or objects that exist. Of course, as Lombard points out, the eternalist is not saying that on that point are dinosaurs, that is, right now (p58, Lombard, 2009). As the eternalist believes that objects exist in the past, in the corresponding way as they exist in the present, they must swear that dinosaurs nevertheless exist (p58, Lombard, 2009). This is point that can lead to confusion. Its important to understand what we mean by the word exist in the statement Dinosaurs exist. Markosian (2004) gives a brilliant account statement of what we should mean by exist in his paper A Defense of Presentism. In what follows, I will consider this explanation and make it clear what exist means.Markosian high flatboats two ways in which we may think about the word exist. The first sense in which we may think of the statement Dinosaurs exist is what Markosian calls the temporal location sense. nether this interpretation, Dinosaurs exist is synonymous with Dinosaurs are present. Under the temporal location sense of the word, the eternalist will agree that no non-present objects exist right now i.e. Dinosaurs do not exist right now. However, this is not what we will be taking the eternalist to mean when they say Dinosaurs exist. Markosian calls the other sense of exist, the ontological sense. Under this interpretation Dinosaurs exist is synonymous with dinosaurs are now in the domain of our most open-ended quantifiers, whether it happens to be presentor non-present (p2, Markosian, 2004). The eternalist will agree with this. The presentist will make do that dinosaurs are not now in the domain of our most unexclusive quantifiers, as dinosaurs do not exist in the present (now), and only things that exist in the present will be included in the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers. Under this interpretation of exist the dis parity between the presentist and the eternalist becomes clear.According to presentism, dinosaurs do not exist i.e. dinosaurs are not included in the things that our most unrestricted quantifiers range over. According to eternalism, dinosaurs do exist i.e. dinosaurs are included in the things that our most unrestricted quantifiers range over. For the Presentist what objects our most unrestricted quantifiers range over is a changing press of fact (p13, Kehler, 2011). This is because the objects of the present are forever changing as time passes (in line with change in the A-series, as discussed earlier in this essay). The reversal is true for the eternalist. What objects our most unrestricted quantifiers range over never changes (in line with the unchanging B-series as discussed earlier).With presentism and eternalism defined and discussed, and the difference between the two made clear by discussing the meaning of exist, I will move onto the nigh section of this essay. In the next section, I will be considering Einsteins supernumerary Theory of Relativity (STR). I will be considering the withdraws that make up Einsteins theory and discussing some of the inconclusive consequences of these. I will then discuss the arguments Philosophers have come up with in an get to show that STR implies a 4D view (eternalism). These arguments will be the Rieldik-Putnam argument, and I will fabricate my own version of Penroses Andromeda Paradox. Once STR is made clear, I will conclude the section by considering what these arguments mean for both presentism and eternalism. sectionalisation 2 The Special Theory of Relativity the Thorn in Presentisms SideAs this is a Philosophy essay, and not a Physics paper, I will not be going into any great detail in explaining Einsteins Special Theory of Relativity (STR), and Im unlikely to do it justice. I will, however, explain the theory in decent detail so to allow me to adequately discuss the arguments in support of the 4D model and against presentism. This will as well help me in defending presentism in the last-place section of this essay. Without adequate knowledge of STR and its paradoxical nature, its unlikely I, or any other philosophers, would be able to even start defending presentism against its claims. I start by considering the postulates behind STR.In 1905, Albert Einstein presented STR in his paper On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies. The theory itself is derived from a number of postulates, of which two can be said to form the brass of Special Relativity (Hamilton, 1998). The first postulate is the Principle of RelativityThere is no implicit rest enclose of reference (p1, Lee, 2012)The second postulate is the Principle of Constancy of the Speed of LightThe speed of light c is a universal perpetual, the same in any inertial trope (Hamilton, 1998)Together, these postulates open up paradoxes which lead Philosophers to the thought that STR implies 4D view of time (eternalism). inertial frame (or inertial reference frame) here will be defined as frames of reference in which Newtons first law of motion is observed. Newtons first law of motion is that every object will remain at rest or in uniform motion in a straight line unless compelled to change its state by the action of an external force (Benson, 2010). Before Special Relativity, the speed of light was thought to account on the speed of the person observing and the speed of the source from which the light came (Lawerence, 2002). An experiment was conducted in the late 1800s by Michelson and Marley in the hope that this was correct (Carlip, 1996). As the earth orbits around the sun at .01% the speed of light (Lawerence ,2002), Michelson and Marely hoped they would be able to show that a light beam moving along with the orbit of the earth would be .01% slower than a light beam going perpendicular to the orbit of the earth. To their surprise, this was not the case. Every attempt to find a difference in the speed of light failed.The light always took exactly the same amount of time to travel down feather either leg (Lawerence, 2002)Since light always travelled at the same speed in the experiments3, Einstein took the constancy of the speed of light to be a fact of nature, and from it, formed the second postulate of STR. Now that the history behind STR has been discussed, and the postulates of STR have been explained, I will move onto discuss how these postulates lead to some interesting paradoxes.The second postulate leads to an interesting paradox. In target to understand the problems that STR poses for presentism, its important to understand what this paradox entails. I will construct this paradox by way of example, based on the example used by Hamilton (1998). Lets pretend Im standing on the surface of the Earth4. Im corrosion a helmet on my head. The helmet has the ability to emit a powerful smash of light. My friend Bob has a super car which just so happens to be capable of moving at a constant fractional the speed of light (1/2c). Bob is moving in a straight line from my right to my left. At the very point that Bob passes me, my helmet lets out a flash of light. This light expands at the same speed (c) in all directions. According to the second postulate of STR, the speed of light is constant for both of us. This means that from my frame of reference, the light expands at the same speed in all directions, and that from Bobs frame of reference the light expands at the same speed in all directions (even though he is moving at half the speed of light away from the light source). The paradox here is that, from our own frame of reference, we both believe we are at the oculus of the flash of light. Its not possible that we are both at the meaning of the flash of light. Before considering the solution to this paradox, I will discuss the example of this paradox as shown by Penroses (1989) Andromeda Paradox.Using his Andromeda Paradox argument, Penrose attempts to sh ow that the Universe is a pre- localized 4D Space-time block, which causes problems for presentism. Penrose (1999) asks us to consider two people ( trap and Jill) walking past to each one other on the street. Jack is walking towards the Andromeda wandflower5and Jill is walking away from the Andromeda. From STR it can be said that Jack and Jill have different ideas about what events are without delay happening in the Andromeda Galaxy. It would take light from the Andromeda Galaxy 2.5 million years to reach either person, and as such, they dont know what events are happening, but whether or not they know of the events happening is of no greatness here. An event on Andromeda that Jack thinks is present (from his frame of reference), is an event that Jill still thinks is yet to happen (from her frame of reference). To Jill, the event is in the future. Penrose calculates the event is 5 days behind in time for Jill.One can calculate that their planes (or spaces) of simultaneity at th e instant at which they pass each other on Earth intersects the history of the world line of Andromeda about 5 days apart (Savitt, 2008)Our planes of simultaneity6are different. The diagram below shows this(modified from BobC_03, 2012)With the paradoxes explained, I can consider what they mean for both Presentism and Eternalism, and show how the minowski Universe appears to favour Eternalism. Its possible that an event in Andromeda is in the present (and according to Presentism does exist) for Jack, but the same event is in the future (and according to Presentism does not exist) for Jill. Here lies the problem that STR its paradoxical nature poses for Presentism. As can be seen, the problem has at the heart of it the second postulate of STR. No matter what speed they walk past each other in opposite directions, if Jack and Jill were to measure the speed of light (in their own frames of reference), they would get the same result.no matter at what speed or in which direction they or the source of the light are moving, must come to the same result when they measure the speed of light (Savitt, 2008)If its not known whether an event is present or past, then how can presentists hold the view that only things in the present exist? What things are in the present are both different for Jack and Jill. In an attempt to solve this, the presentist might try to say that the event is taken to be present or future depending on whether it is present or future in the impregnable rest frame (p5, Eichman, 2007). However, according to STR thither is no peremptory rest frame, or absolute simultaneity, and at that placefore, there can be no absolute present.If we mount that STR is true, the following argument against Presentism can be constructed(1) STR is true.(2) STR entails that there is no such relation as absolute simultaneity.(3) If there is no such relation as absolute simultaneity, then there is no such property as absolute presentness.(4) Presentism entails that there is such a property as absolute presentness.(5) Presentism is false.(p29, Markosian, 2004)Now that STR has been discussed adequately and that the tizzy it poses for Presentism has been highlighted, I can move onto the final section of this essay. In the final section, I will consider two ways in which philosophers have tried to defend presentism against the seeming threat posed by STR. The first defense is brought forward by Mark Hinchliff (2000) in his paper A Defense of Presentism in a Relativistic Setting. The second defense, and the defense which I find more compelling, is brought forward by Ned Markosian (2004) in his paper A Defense of Presentism. I will explain why I find this defense more compelling, and why I think Hinchliffs defense doesnt work.Section 3 Defending PresentismThe first defense against STR that I will consider is what Hinchliff calls The straits Model. In the point model, Hinchliff claims that in STR the present is to be place with the here-now (pS579, Hin chliff, 2000). In other words, a presentist can argue that in STR, only a single space-time point exists the here-now. Hinchliff does not hold this view himself and says that he knows of no one who actually holds this view (S579, Hinchliff, 2000). Nevertheless he feels its worthy enough to discuss. A standard objection against this model is to say that its nonsocial, in that nothing but the here-now exists. This objection is easily refuted however. Saying its lonely is akin to get rid ofing solipisism because theres no other people. Something stronger is needed in order to reject either the Point Model or solipsism. Putnam (1967) offers a better objection against the view however. Putnam says that anything that is past must have previously been present (p246, Putnam, 1967). Under Point presentism however, there are events in the past which have never been present. Therefore, Point Presentism violates the conceptual truth that what is past was present (S579, Hinchliff)This can be shown by way of example. Lets pretend an event occurs which is space-like separated from my here-now. It is therefore not in the present from my frame of reference. When time moves on, the event is however included in my past here-now, without ever being in the present, and therefore profaned a conceptual truth.A presentist may try to argue that point presentism does not violate a conceptual truth, but this would lead them to hurt when trying to explain how certain objects of the present (objects that exists) cease to exist (fade into the past). I do not think this is a suitable defense of presentism against STR. I think if a presentist is to hold their view, then they must look for a way of fitting the outcomes of STR into that view. Point presentism attempts to change presentism in such a way that makes it compatible with STR, and fails to do so. Presentists should rather attempt to change STR in such a way that makes it compatible with presentism. I believe this is what Markosia n (2004) attempts to do in his defense of presentism. I will now consider this defense and explain why I find it more compelling than Point Presentism.In his defense of presentism, Markosian (2004) considers whether STR contains enough philosophical baggage built into it to entail the proposition that there is no such relation as absolute simultaneity (p31, Markosian, 2004). If this is not the case, then there is no reason to assume that STR poses problems for presentism. Marksoian asks us to consider two different types of STR (p31, Markosian, 2004)STR+ This version of STR does have enough philosophical baggage built into it to entail that there is no such thing as absolute simultaneity.STR- This version of STR does not have enough philosophical baggage built into it to entail that there is no such thing as absolute simultaneity.Markosian rejects STR+ and accepts STR-. I believe the reasons for why he thinks this is key to any presentist wishing to defend their view against STR. All falsifiable evidence which suggests that STR+ is true, equally supports STR- (p31, Markosian 2004). Just because it is not physically possible to determine whether two objects or events are absolutely simultaneous (p31, Markosian) does not entail that there is no such thing as absolute simultaneity, and no absolute present. Consider the Andromeda Paradox as explained earlier. From their own frame of reference (or plain of simultaneity) their idea of what event is present is different7. The presentist is able to agree with this view. Agreeing with this, does not mean they must reject their view on absolute simultaneity or their view that an absolute present exists. It may be the case that an absolute rest frame is not well-disposed to us. The presentist can reject the first postulate of STR. With this said, it seems the eternalist is unable to refute presentism by appealing to STR, and it looks likely that any such argument will end in a stalemate. The eternalist and presentist view with regards to STR can be summed up as followsEternalist STR is true and entails there is no absolute simultaneity or absolute present. Therefore, presentism is incorrect.Presentist STR being true does not entail there is no absolute simultaneity or absolute present. It entails that these are not accessible to us, but nonetheless may still exist. According to me, they do exist.Its impossible to say whether either view is true or false (How would one uprise that there is or isnt an absolute rest frame?), resulting in a stalemate. Its certainly seems that its not necessarily true that STR refutes presentism.ConclusionIn this essay, I have achieved what I had set out to do. I have defined and explained what both presentism and eternalism entail. Ive made it clear what the differences between the two are and Ive shown that its important to understand what the word exists mean when discussing both views. I have also explained and discussed the Special Theory of Relativity. In d oing so, I have shown how the paradoxes it leads to, causes problems for presentism, and have shown why the eternalist might try to attack presentism using STR. Finally, I considered ways in which the presentist may try to defend their position against STR and the eternalist. I have shown that any attempt by the eternalist to use STR against presentism will result in a stalement. The empirical evidence which supports STR+ equally supports STR-, and the presentist only needs to reject STR+ and accept STR-. The problem with using STR to attack presentism is that STR+ must be assumed to be true. It is not necessarily the case that STR+ is true, and the presentist may use this point in defending their position. STR+ (or a theory with the same consequences) may be shown to be true someday, but until that day comes, the eternalist should make use of some other weapon in trying to attack presentism.Word Count 4629 assimilator ID 1818201